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Abstract Iceberg orders, which allow traders to hide a portion of their order size, have
become prevalent in many electronic limit order markets. This paper investigates, via
a real options analysis, whether small traders, who have no use for submitting iceberg
orders, are better off submitting their orders to fully transparent markets which have
low depth, or to more liquid markets which do permit the placement of iceberg orders
by large traders. Surprisingly, we find that in the context of our model, small traders
are better off submitting to fully transparent markets in spite of them being less liquid.
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JEL Classification C44 · G11
1 Introduction
Iceberg orders which are a particular type of limit order permitted by a large number
of exchanges (for example, among others, the London Stock Exchange (with its order-
driven services SETS, SETSmm, and IOB), Euronext, the Toronto Stock Exchange,
the Australian Stock Exchange, and the NYSE). The investors submitting such orders
to the limit order book (LOB) specify the total quantity they want to buy or sell at a
particular price and this is recorded in the book according to its price and time priority.
However, only a fraction of the total order size is visibly displayed to the other market
participants. The quantity displayed is called a peak and when the full size of the peak
has been executed against incoming orders of the opposite sign, the peak quantity is
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automatically renewed and positioned behind other visible limit orders at the same
price. As the hidden depth is gradually revealed, investors who carefully monitor the
order flow in the LOB are expected to detect the presence of hidden depth. However,
even when hidden depth is detected, the investor cannot determine the iceberg order’s
full size, but he can form increasingly precise expectations as to its size as more and
more peaks are executed and new ones displayed.
The use of iceberg orders in limit order markets has become prevalent in recent
years, as documented by empirical evidence. For example, Tuttle (2006) reports that
hidden depth accounts for 22% of the inside depth in Nasdaq 100 stocks, while
DeWinne and D’Hondt (2007) find that it accounts for 45% of the total depth avail-
able at the best five quotes, on average, for stocks constituting the CAC 40 index on
Euronext-Paris. Bessembinder et al. (2009) also report that, out of a sample of one
hundred stocks traded on Euronext-Paris, iceberg orders account for approximately
44% of order volume, and Frey and Sandås (2009) show that on Xetra, while the
iceberg orders’ share of all non-marketable orders submitted is only about 9%, these
orders are, on average, between 12 and 20 times larger than usual limit orders.
The natural question to ask, therefore, is what are the costs and benefits of iceberg
orders to financial markets and their participants? The general consensus appears to
be that the attractiveness to traders of using iceberg orders is that they help to manage
exposure risk1 (see Harris 1996; Aitken et al. 2001; DeWinne and D’Hondt 2007;
Frey and Sandås 2009; Bessembinder et al. 2009). Anand and Weaver (2004) show
that by introducing iceberg orders on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 2002, the total
depth of the LOB increased significantly. Consistent with this result, Moinas (2010)
shows that larger market depth induces liquidity demanders to submit larger orders,
which increases their expected utility, and liquidity suppliers can use iceberg orders to
decrease the informational impact of their large orders. Consequently, both liquidity
demanders and liquidity suppliers have higher welfare when trading in iceberg markets.
Buti and Rindi (2013) develop a model which also shows that traders who can use
iceberg orders have greater total welfare.
While the above studies all highlight the benefits of iceberg orders, they are, how-
ever, all focussed on traders for which it is plausible to use such orders; i.e., large
traders. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no analysis on the effects of
iceberg orders on small traders who have no use for submitting iceberg orders and,
hence, do not benefit from iceberg orders in terms of exposure risk management. Reg-
ulators are concerned about the effects of opaque markets on the welfare of market
participants as a whole. In particular, they are concerned that opaque markets may
affect the distribution of welfare between small and large traders, as opaque markets
are primarily used by the latter (Buti et al. 2017). The reason is that large traders will
submit iceberg orders on exchanges which permit their use, and thereby the transparent
markets will suffer in terms of liquidity provision which will affect the welfare of small
1 Exposure risk is caused by the signal that an order gives to other market participants which helps them
to infer the investor’s motive and/or price impact of his trade. This could induce front-running which is the
attempt by other market participants to win the order flow by marginally outstripping the price of a large
order and, as a result, decrease the probability of full execution of a large limit order that was placed earlier
on the same side of the book.
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traders. Therefore, it seems sensible to suggest that small traders would be better off
submitting their orders to markets which permit the use of hidden depth. In this paper
we address this issue by determining the welfare of a small trader who submits full
orders only to a market which permits the use of iceberg orders. We then determine the
welfare of this trader from submitting the same orders to a fully transparent market,
and we find the surprising result that, while liquidity may be lower in the transparent
market, their total welfare is greatly reduced if they migrate to the market with hidden
depth.
The trader has an amount of capital which he wishes to use for investing in some
stock. He starts to monitor the order flow of the stock in the LOB and at this stage
he is interested in two things; (i) whether there is enough hidden depth in the LOB
at a particular ask price of his choosing for him to be able to execute his full order at
that price, and (ii) whether the demand for the stock is likely to increase sufficiently
for him to be able to sell his full inventory at a higher price at some future time. He
monitors the order flow in the LOB at the prices he wishes to buy and sell the stock
to infer the likelihood of (i) and (ii). These likelihoods are updated in a Bayesian way
every time a new order enters the LOB at the relevant prices. He invests in the stock
once he is sufficiently convinced that the order will be executed and, importantly, once
he is sufficiently convinced that he will be able to sell the entire order at a higher price
at some time in the future. Once he invests, he continues to monitor the order flow at
the sell price to determine the best time to submit his sell order such that the profit
from the trade is maximised. In particular, this means that he is looking for the time at
which the likelihood that his sell order will be fully executed at his preferred sell price
is highest. This optimal investment timing approach has been well-developed in the
corporate finance literature (see, for example, Flor and Hansen 2013; Gutierrez and
Ruiz-Aliseda 2011) but, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first application of the
approach in the iceberg order literature.
Our model differs from other theoretical models on LOBs and iceberg orders (see,
for example, Moinas 2010; Boulatov and George 2013; Buti and Rindi 2013) in that
those models are typically concerned with the traders’ decisions over what type of
order to submit and the optimal price, peak and/or order size. By contrast, we take
the prices and quantities submitted as exogeneous parameters because we want to
determine how a trade executed in a fully transparent market compares, in terms of
welfare, with that same trade executed in a market with possible iceberg orders. If we
were to optimise over prices or quantities, we would likely get different optimal values
depending on the features of the different markets, implying that the trades would be
different. For this reason, our optimal submission strategy is then one of timing; in
particular, we solve two optimal stopping problems conditional on the possibility that
there can be hidden depth in the LOB at the prices the investor wishes to trade at. The
optimal buy strategy is influenced by the option to sell and, therefore, we must solve
for the optimal time to buy using backward induction. First we solve for the optimal
time to sell the stock that has been purchased and secondly we solve for the optimal
time to buy conditional on the sell strategy. Our model is then adapted to determine
the optimal timing strategies in the fully transparent case.
The set-up of our model in terms of information flow and hidden depth detection
is consistent with empirical evidence on how hidden depth is detected from DeWinne
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and D’Hondt (2007) and Frey and Sandås (2009). Technically, it is closely related
the models of information flow in Thijssen et al. (2004) and Delaney and Thijssen
(2015). The former paper is concerned with a capital budgeting decision and focuses
on a stand-alone option, while the latter considers how the exercise strategy of some
investment option is influenced by the option to voluntarily disclose the investment
return at some future date. While this paper is similar to Delaney and Thijssen (2015)
in the sense that they are both compound option problems, in the latter paper, the
decision variable is the same for both inter-related options whereas in this paper there
is a separate decision variable for the buy and sell strategies; one representing the
likely presence of hidden depth at a particular price, and one representing the likely
market demand for the asset in the future. This implies that the approach to solving for
the optimisation problems in this paper differs to quite a large extent to the approach
needed in Delaney and Thijssen (2015). In particular, we need to consider the fact
that the two variables in this paper must not be totally independent from each other,
which adds another dimension to the optimisation approach which is absent in other
models.
Next we determine the trader’s expected total welfare from entering into the round
trip trade and adhering to the optimal strategies derived. We also determine his welfare
from submitting his orders to fully transparent markets where there is no hidden
depth. In this market, depth is lower, but surprisingly, his welfare from trading in the
transparent market is significantly higher than his welfare in the iceberg market. The
result arises because, in the context of our model, the absence of any possibility of
hidden depth means that the orders will only be submitted when the traders are certain
of their execution and, hence, the expected payoff is higher than in the hidden depth
case. Moreover, in the hidden depth case, the trader risks having his sell order filled
at a lower price per share than he bought it at, whereas in the fully transparent case,
he does not face such a risk. Therefore, the conclusion is that traders for whom it is
not appropriate to use iceberg orders should send their orders to transparent markets
in spite of the fact that they are less liquid than markets permitting iceberg order
submission.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The general framework of our
model is described in the next section. In Sect. 3 we solve for the optimal buy and
sell order placement times in the hidden depth and fully transparent cases. In Sect. 4
we conduct our welfare analysis and in Sect. 5 we give some concluding remarks. All
proofs are placed in the “Appendix”.
2 The model
2.1 General framework
Consider a double auction market that operates through an electronic trading system,
in which orders are recorded in a limit order book (LOB) but full volume is not known
to the marketplace. Hidden liquidity is generated by iceberg orders. A risk-neutral
investor intends to trade in this market and conceives a round-trip trade using market
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orders only2: buy low–sell high. His problem is to find the optimal time at which to
buy and subsequently sell the stock so that his profit from the trade is maximised.
The investor starts to monitor the LOB at some time τ0 = 0 where time is contin-
uous. He has some fixed amount of capital which he wishes to invest in a particular
stock at a price A per share, and which he will try to sell off at some future date for a
profit; i.e., at some unit price B H such that B H > A.3 I denote by Q the number of
shares he can purchase with his capital at a unit price A; i.e., Q = capital/A.
In a LOB which permits hidden depth, the total net demand at a given price j is
comprised of limit orders that are visible and which all market participants can observe,
denoted v jτ , and a hidden component of depth which is not observable, denoted h jτ .
Total net demand is thus v jτ + h jτ . Every time a new order is submitted to the book at
j , the total net demand at j is updated.
Buy and sell orders for the asset enter the book at random points in time. The
dynamics of order arrival are governed by a Poisson process with parameter λ, and
this is the same for prices A and B H .4 Thus, the probability that a new order to buy
or sell one more share of the asset enters the book at price j within an infinitesimal
time interval dt is λdt .
At every instant τ , the investor monitors the visible net demand in the book at the
prices he wants to transact at; i.e., vAτ if at time τ he is waiting to buy, and vB
H
τ if at
time τ he is waiting to sell. He does in fact also monitor vB Hτ if at time τ he is waiting
to buy, but we return to this point in a later section. While he can only observe the
visible portion of net demand, he knows that there may be more hidden depth available
in the book, but he does not know how much. That is, he does not know h jτ , but he
knows it is not necessarily zero.
The investor infers the state of the order; i.e., whether it has hidden depth or not,
correctly with probability θ ∈ (0.5, 1). Hence, θ can be thought of as a measure for
the reliability of the order flow as a signal of hidden depth.
The signals are modeled as binomially distributed random variables with parameter
θ , and are explained as follows: when he is waiting to submit an order, the investor
examines the visible portion net demand at the price he is wanting to trade at each
instant. These v jτ orders that the investor observes sitting in the LOB could be owing
to (i) full orders that are placed and have never had any hidden depth associated with
them, denoted as v j fτ , or (ii) the peak (visible) part of an iceberg order, denoted as v j iτ .
2 The assumption of submitting only market orders is made for analytical tractability. The reasoning is that
the point of the model is that hidden depth affects the likelihood of order execution, and this point this is
true for limit order submissions also. Hence, assuming limit order submission would only complicate the
analysis by adding extra discounting without altering any of the results on hidden depth which assuming
market orders will generate anyway. Moreover, the plausibility of the assumption is supported by empirical
evidence from DeWinne and D’Hondt (2007) and Frey and Sandås (2009) who find that the possible
existence of hidden depth at the best opposite quote significantly increases the use of market orders.
3 Why the trader chooses to buy and sell the stock at these specific prices is not relevant to the point of the
model and, hence, are fixed exogenously.
4 The assumption that the order arrival rate is independent of price is justified in the model because assuming
a price dependent order arrival rate would give no additional insight into the impact of the possible existence
of iceberg orders in the LOB on small investors’ welfare. Hence, for expositional ease, we assume λ is price
independent.
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If most of the visible orders in the book are owing to full orders that have been placed,
then it is likely that there will be little hidden depth in the LOB. However, if most of
the visible orders are iceberg peaks, then it is likely that there is quite a lot of hidden
depth. Thus |v jτ | = |v j iτ | + |v j fτ |, and |v j iτ | and |v j fτ | signal to the investor the absence
or presence of hidden depth.
To determine the optimal time at which to place his buy and sell orders, the investor
must estimate the likelihood of these being filled at A and B H , respectively. This is
related to the transparency of the book. At τ0, when he starts to monitor the order flow
of the asset as recorded in the LOB, the investor cannot distinguish between those
visible orders that have hidden depth and those that do not. Thus, his initial prior over
whether the visible net demand is the true net demand of the asset at any recorded
price is p0 = 50%. This belief is updated in a Bayesian manner every time a new order
arrives in the book because the investor decides whether each order he sees entering
the book is a full order (with no hidden depth) which we denote as F , or the release
of an existing iceberg tranche (i.e., has hidden depth associated with it), denoted by
I . By this we mean that if a new tranche of the iceberg order is released to the visible
part of the book, this alters the LOB in a systematic way from what would be expected
after a given trade, which signals the presence of hidden depth. Of course, the change
could be due to the placement of a usual full limit order, but if the investor starts to see
a pattern of say, x orders entering the book in a systematic way every so often when
a trade is executed, he deems these orders as being a likely iceberg tranche release.
The conditional probability that the true state of the LOB at price j is accurately
represented by what is visible (i.e., that all visible orders come from full orders placed
and have no hidden depth) is given by:
P
(
F ||v j fτ |, |v j iτ |
)
=
P
(
|v j fτ |, |v j iτ ||F
)
P(F)
P
(
|v j fτ |, |v j iτ ||F
)
P(F) + P
(
|v j fτ |, |v j iτ ||I
)
P(I )
=
( |v jτ |
|v j fτ |
)
θ |v
j f
τ |(1 − θ)|v j iτ | p0
( |v jτ |
|v j fτ |
)
θ |v j fτ |(1 − θ)|v j iτ | p0 +
( |v jτ |
|v j iτ |
)
θ |v j iτ |(1 − θ)|v j fτ |(1 − p0)
= θ
k jτ
θk
j
τ + (1 − θ)k jτ
:= p
(
k jτ
)
, (1)
where p0 = 0.5 (as discussed), and k jτ := |v j fτ |−|v j iτ | denotes the difference between
the visible net demand generated by orders he believes to be full orders with no hidden
depth, and the visible net demand generated by the tranches of iceberg orders that have
been released and, thus, have hidden depth associated with them.
We interpret p(k jτ ), denoted by p jτ hereafter, in the following way. The larger is
|v j iτ |, the more offers in the visible part of the book that are believed to come from
iceberg orders relative to full orders. Hence, the more likely it is that there is hidden
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depth at price j and the lower is p jτ . If Q > |v jτ |, then he has more orders he wishes
to buy or sell at j than he sees available at time τ . Hence, he is uncertain whether his
order will be executed fully if he submits at τ , but if the likelihood that there is hidden
depth present is high, then translates to a greater likelihood of having his order filled.
Hence, the lower is p jτ , the more likely he deems it that his order will be filled. In other
words, p jτ represents the probability that his order will not get filled at j if submitted
at time τ . If Q ≤ |v jτ |, then he knows for sure that his order will be filled.
The inverse function of Eq. (1) is given by
k jτ := k(p jτ ) =
ln
(
1−p jτ
p jτ
)
ln
( 1−θ
θ
) (2)
which is monotonically increasing in p jτ .
2.2 Set-up of the optimal stopping problems
The investor’s objective is to maximise his expected discounted payoff from the round-
trip trade. He must solve two optimal stopping problems: (i) he must determine the
optimal time at which to submit his market order to buy Q units of the stock at A, and
(ii) he must determine the optimal time at which to submit his market order to sell
the Q units of at B H . Figure 1 depicts the two phases of the investor’s problem with
expected payoffs which are introduced below.
2.2.1 The buy problem
Suppose at some time τ ≥ τ0 the investor is waiting to buy Q units of the stock at A.
If vAτ > 0, then he knows that there is an excess of buy orders in the book at A waiting
to be filled so he does not submit because he knows for sure that his order will not be
filled. If vAτ < 0 and, moreover, if Q ≤ |vAτ | then he knows with certainty that his order
will be fully executed since there are enough visible sell orders available. However, if
vAτ ≤ 0 and Q > |vAτ |, he can only assign some positive probability (1 − pAτ ) to his
Fig. 1 The timeline and expected payoffs of the round-trip trade
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order being filled at A. It will be fully executed if there is sufficient hidden depth on
the offer side; that is, if |vAτ | < Q ≤ |vAτ +hAτ |. We assume that if the order is not fully
executed at A, it is not executed at all; that is, the buy order he submits is a fill-or-kill
type of market order.5 Hence, his payoff from non-execution is zero.
Buying the stock only has value to the investor if he can sell it in the future at a
profit. Hence, it will only be optimal for him to invest if he is sufficiently convinced
that he will be able to sell it in the future at B H . It is for this reason that he monitors
the visible order imbalance at B H while he is waiting to invest because it provides
him with an insight into how demand for the stock is evolving at B H .
If vB Hτ increases, this implies buy orders have been submitted to the book at B H
and serves as a signal of an increase in demand and greater likelihood of being able to
sell at B H in future. However, a decrease in vB Hτ has the opposite effect. Therefore,
if the investor is certain that his buy order will be fully executed at A if he submits at
time τ , he will only submit if he is convinced enough that the evolution of demand
for the stock at B H is such that he is likely to be able sell it all in the future. To this
end, in order to solve for the optimal time to buy the stock, we must also determine
the investor’s conditional probability q(vB Hτ ) that he will sell the Q units at B H in the
future. We focus on this issue in more detail, and derive explicitly q(vB Hτ ), in Sect. 3
in which we present and discuss the solution to the buy side problem.
Finally, the optimal time to buy cannot be determined without considering vB Hτ and
k B Hτ in relation to each other. We elaborate on this in Appendix C where we derive
the solution for the optimal time to buy.
The optimal stopping problem for the investor when he is wanting to buy is to find
a buying time, τ ∗b > 0, such that
V ∗b
(
k Aτ∗b , v
B H
τ∗b
)
= max
τ≥τ0
E0
[
e−rτ Vb
(
k Aτ , vB
H
τ
)]
, (3)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, Vb(k Aτ , vB
H
τ ) denotes the value of submitting a market
buy order in states k Aτ and vB
H
τ , and E0 is the expectation operation at τ0 = 0. Note
that we re-introduce, and provide more detail about, Vb(k Aτ , vB
H
τ ) in Sect. 3 in which
we derive the buy threshold.
2.2.2 The sell problem
Once the investor’s buy order is filled, he continues to monitor the order flow dynamics
to determine the best time to sell the stock so that his profit from the trade is maximised.
By this we mean that he aims to submit his sell market order when the likelihood of
there being sufficient depth to fill it at his optimal price B H is high. Since the investor
now has an inventory of stock he wishes to sell, we assume that his sell order is a usual
market order and not of fill-or-kill type. At some time τs > τb, where τb denotes the
5 This is a reasonable assumption since investors without inventory positions often rely extensively on so-
called fill-or-kill market orders. Additionally, assuming the buy order is a usual market order complicates
the model without providing any additional insight.
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time at which he purchased the stock, he submits an order to sell the Q units of the
asset at B H , where B H := Aer(τs−τb) + γ , for some γ ≥ 0. Hence, at time τs he will
make a profit of Qγ from the trade if executed fully. The order will be executed fully at
B H if and only if buy orders prevail at B H so that Q ≤vB Hτs +hB
H
τs
for vB Hτs +hB
H
τs
> 0.
If Q >vB Hτs +hB
H
τs
, the order must walk down the book in search of execution since it
is of usual type. If this is the case, then the Q units are sold through a series of trades
at a range of prices {Bm}Mm=1 ≤ B H . We assume that the average execution price,
denoted by BL < B H such that BL = ∑Mm=1 qm Bm/Q, with
∑M
m=1 qm = Q, results
in a loss for the investor. In particular, we define BL := Aer(τs−τb) − γ , so that his
loss at τs would be γ Q.
The optimal stopping problem for the investor when he is wanting to sell is to find
a selling time, τ ∗s > τ ∗b , such that
V ∗s
(
k B Hτ∗s
)
= max
τ>τb
E0
[
e−rτ Vs(k B
H
τ )
]
, (4)
where Vs(k B
H
τ ) denotes the expected payoff from selling in state k B
H
τ . This is given
by
Vs
(
k B Hτ
)
= pB Hτ
(
BL − Aer(τ−τb)
)
Q +
(
1 − pB Hτ
) (
B H − Aer(τ−τb)
)
Q
=
(
1 − 2pB Hτ
)
Qγ.
(5)
In summary, the tradeoffs in the model from submitting orders and waiting are as
follows. While submitting an order to purchase the stock does not penalise the investor
if it is not executed, submission is still costly. This is because if it is executed fully, he
loses an amount of capital Q A which he will only recoup in full if there is sufficient
demand for the stock in the future that he can sell it all off at a higher price B H . The
future evolution of demand is uncertain and, hence, before submission he must be
sufficiently convinced about being able to sell in future. Uncertainty is resolved by
examining the visible net demand flow in the LOB at B H . Once he has executed his
order to buy, if he submits his order to sell when there is sufficient depth on the bid side
of the LOB at the higher price, then he will make a profit of γ Q from the trade, but
if there is not sufficient depth, he will make a loss of this amount instead. Hence, he
must be careful about only submitting his order to sell when the depth is sufficiently
high. He examines vB Hτ for all τ < τs to determine this time.
3 The solution of the model
In this section we solve the optimal stopping problems (3) and (4). We begin by solving
the sell threshold since selling is a stand-alone decision for the investor. However, the
value of buying the stock is dependent on the value of selling it and, thus, must be
solved via backward induction. We also present the fully transparent case such that
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the trader submits his orders to fully transparent markets where there is no possibility
of hidden depth.
3.1 Sell threshold
To determine the optimal time at which to submit a market order to sell the Q units
of the stock at B H , the investor determines a threshold in k B Hτ , denoted by k B
H
τ∗s , such
that he will sell for all k B Hτ ≤ k B Hτ∗s and not otherwise. The reasoning is as follows.
When the investor buys the stock at A at time τb, vB
H
τb < 0. This is because B
H > A
by assumption and, thus, it is reasonable to presume there will not be any buy limit
orders for the stock at B H waiting in the LOB at time τb for incoming sell orders to
execute against them because the stock can be bought for a lower price A. Hence, sell
orders prevail at B H and the probability of the investor not having his sell market order
filled at B H at time τb is one. He will only sell when he is sufficiently convinced that
his full order will be filled at B H . He will be certain this will be the case at some time
τ > τb if vB
H
τ ≥ Q. However, since there can be hidden depth through buy iceberg
orders being placed at B H , the investor does not need to wait until vB Hτ ≥ Q since
it will get fully executed at B H if 0 <vB Hτ < Q ≤vB Hτ +hB Hτ . Thus, he will submit
his order to sell when he is sufficiently convinced that Q ≤vB Hτ +hB Hτ . When this is
the case, the probability that his sell order will not be executed at B H is lower than
pB Hτb (i.e. certainty) and, since k B
H
τ is monotonic and increasing in pB
H
τ , k B
H
τ < k B
H
τb .
Hence, the process hits the sell threshold from above implying that the lower is k B Hτ∗s ,
the longer the investor waits before selling.
The solution to Eq. (4) is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose the risk-neutral investor is wanting to sell Q units of the asset
at some price B H at time τ ≥ τb,
1. If vB Hτ < 0, it is never optimal for him to submit a sell market order at B H .
2. If vB H ≥ 0, it is optimal to submit a sell market order when k B Hτ is at or below
k B Hτ∗s =
ln
(
1−pB H
τ∗s
pB H
τ∗s
)
ln
( 1−θ
θ
) , (6)
such that
pB
H
τ∗s =
(r + λ(1 − θ)) (r + λ(1 − β2)) − λ2θ(1 − θ)
(2r + λ) (r + λ(1 − β2)) − 2λ2θ(1 − θ) , (7)
and
β2 = r + λ2λ −
1
2
√(
r + λ
λ
)2
− 4θ(1 − θ). (8)
Moreover, pB Hτ∗s is a well-defined probability.
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Proof See Appendix B. unionsq
3.2 Buy threshold
The investor wishes to purchase Q units of the asset at some time τ at A. If vAτ < 0 and
if Q ≤ |vAτ |, then his order will be fully executed with certainty, but entering into the
trade only has value for the investor if he is sufficiently convinced that he will be able
to sell his Q units in the future for a profit. Hence, there is value for him in waiting
before submitting his market buy order. He evaluates his option to buy at each instant
from the perspective of a seller because once he buys, he immediately acquires the
option to sell. He will only buy the stock if the value from investing exceeds the value
from waiting. In this case, the value from waiting is not related to gaining information
about whether his order will be fully executed because he knows with certainty it will
be, but over his expectation that the demand for the stock will increase sufficiently
in the future for him to be able to sell Q units at B H . Indeed, even for vAτ < 0 and
Q > |vAτ | whereby his buy order will not be filled with certainty, his value of waiting
is not related to gaining information about whether his order will be filled at A. This
is because the order is of fill-or kill type and, thus, if it is not filled, the investor is no
worse off than if he had not submitted it at all.
He will submit his order to buy at A when he is sufficiently convinced that the
demand for the stock will increase in the future so that he can make a profit on selling
it. This implies that we need to find a buying threshold which pertains to B H .
Recall that at the time of buying the asset, vB Hτb < 0. This implies that the limit
orders sitting in the book at B H at time τb are sell orders. In fact we presume that
vB
H
τ < 0 for all τ0 ≤ τ ≤ τb, which is a reasonable presumption. If a sell limit
order enters the LOB at B H , then ΔvB Hτ < 0. In other words, vB
H
τ becomes more
negative and this is a negative signal to the investor in terms of the future demand
being sufficiently high for him to be able to sell. On the other hand, if an aggressive
buy order6 (either market or limit) enters at B H , then ΔvB Hτ > 0, and this is a positive
signal regarding future demand. Hence, we want to determine a threshold in vB Hτ ,
denoted by vB H
τ∗b
, at or above which the investor will submit an order to buy the stock.
We assume that when the investor starts to monitor the order flow at τ0, he has a
prior belief P(S) = q0 that the demand for the asset is such that he will be able to sell
it at B H in the future. Every time he sees a buy or sell order enter the LOB at B H ,
this belief is revised in a Bayesian way. Hence, the visible net order imbalance vB Hτ
is a signal to the investor about future demand at that price. The signal is an accurate
representation of the future demand with probability η ∈ (0.5, 1). For example, the
higher is the visible order book imbalance, the better the outlook in terms of future
demand. However, many orders (eg. fleeting orders7) are placed in LOBs which are not
6 An aggressive order is one that crosses the bid-ask spread. An aggressive buy order will be placed at the
offer price or higher.
7 Fleeting orders are limit orders which are canceled shortly after they are submitted. They are typically
priced more aggressively than limit orders with longer lives (see Hasbrouck and Saar 2009). One of the
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reliable representations of demand for the asset, but impact the visible order imbalance
nonetheless. Thus, η is a measure of the quality of vB Hτ as a signal of future market
demand for the stock at B H .
We model the buy and sell orders as binomially distributed random variables with
parameter η. Then the conditional probability at time τ ≤ τb that he will sell the Q
units at B H at some future time τs > τb is given by
P
(
S|vB Hτ
)
=
P
(
vB
H
τ |S
)
P(S)
P
(
vB
H
τ |S
)
P(S) + P (vB Hτ |N S
)
P(N S)
=
P
(
vB
H
τ |S
)
P
(
vB
H
τ |S
) + ζ P (vB Hτ |N S
)
(9)
where S and N S denote “Sell” and “Not Sell”, respectively and ζ := P(N S)/P(S) =
(1 − q0)/q0 is the prior odds ratio.
Now
P
(
vB
H
τ |S
)
=
(|bB Hτ + s B Hτ |
|bB Hτ |
)
η|bB
H
τ |(1 − η)|s B Hτ |,
where bB Hτ denote buy orders at B H at τ , and s B
H
τ denote sell orders. η is the success
probability and buy orders imply success in this case (i.e., event “S”) because the more
buy orders, the more likely the investor will be able to sell in the future. Similarly,
P
(
vB
H
τ |N S
)
=
(|bB Hτ + s B Hτ |
|s B Hτ |
)
η|s B
H
τ |(1 − η)|bB Hτ |.
However, at time τ , |bB Hτ | = 0 and |s B Hτ | ≡ −vB Hτ because vB Hτ < 0. Substituting in
Eq. (9)
P
(
S|vB Hτ
)
= η
vB
H
τ
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
= q(vB Hτ )
= q B Hτ .
(10)
Equation (10) has inverse function
vB
H
τ =
ln
(
1−q B Hτ
q B Hτ
)
− ln ζ
ln
(
1−η
η
) (11)
which monotonically increases in q B Hτ .
Footnote 7 continued
main reasons investors use such orders is to search for latent liquidity in markets in which there is hidden
depth. Hence, they do not necessarily represent an investor’s shift in demand for the asset.
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Finally, we revisit Eq. (3) and provide some structure to Vb(k Aτ , vB
H
τ ). When the
investor buys, since vB Hτb < 0, he will not sell immediately since he knows with
certainty that his order will not be filled at B H . In fact, even when the next aggressive
buy order enters at B H , it is not likely his sell threshold will be reached. Hence, when
he buys, he acquires the option to sell pertaining to this scenario, denoted as Vs1(k B
H
τb )(see Scenario 1 and Eq. (A.7) in Appendix B). Moreover, the investor will only fill
his order at A at time τb with probability (1 − pAτb ), and with certainty if Q ≤ |vAτb |.
Therefore,
Vb
(
k Aτb , v
B H
τb
)
=
(
1 − pAτb
)
Vs1
(
k B Hτb
)
. (12)
Proposition 2 Suppose a risk-neutral investor is wanting to buy Q units of the asset
at some price A at time τ ≥ τ0, in order to sell at some price B H > A at a later date
1. If vAτ > 0, it is never optimal for him to submit a market order to buy the asset at
A.
2. If vAτ ≤ 0 and vB Hτ < 0, it is optimal to submit a market buy order at A when vB Hτ
is at or above
vB
H
τ∗b
=
ln
(
1−q B H
τ∗b
q B H
τ∗b
)
− ln ζ
ln
(
1−η
η
) , (13)
such that
q B
H
τ∗b
= η − 1
2η − 1 +
β2
2η − 1
(
r + λ
λ
− α1λη(1 − η)
α1(r + λ) − λη(1 − η)
)
(
θ
(1 − θ)β22 + θ3
) (14)
and 0 < q B H
τ∗b
< 1.
Proof See Appendix C unionsq
3.3 The fully transparent case
We present the fully transparent case such that the trader submits orders to fully
transparent markets. This enables us to determine whether small traders are better off
submitting their orders to markets permitting the placement of iceberg orders.
3.3.1 Fully transparent sell threshold
Since there is no hidden depth presence in this case, |vB H iτ | = 0. Hence, k B Hτ =
v
B H f
τ ≡ vB Hτ . Therefore, the optimal policy for the trader is to sell whenever vB Hτ ≥ Q,
and not otherwise.
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Notably, vB Hτ in the fully transparent market is equivalent to the visible depth that
comes from full orders only in the iceberg market. In the iceberg market, there is also
the depth that can arise from iceberg orders (both the visible part and the hidden part).
Therefore, the depth in the transparent market is lower than the depth in the iceberg
market, which is in line with empirical findings (eg. Anand and Weaver 2004; Aitken
et al. 2001).
Proposition 3 In the absence of hidden depth, it is optimal for the trader to submit
an order to sell at B H at time τ > τb if and only if vB Hτ ≥ Q.
3.3.2 Fully transparent buy threshold
When the trader is considering submitting an order to buy, as previously discussed,
he is not interested in the likely presence of hidden depth at this stage. Therefore, his
optimal buy strategy is the same whether there may be hidden depth or not. This leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In the absence of hidden depth, it is optimal for the trader to submit
an order to buy at A at time τb for all vB Hτ ≥vB Hτ∗b , where v
B H
τ∗b
is given by Eq. (13), and
otherwise to wait.
4 Welfare analysis
In this section we compare the trader’s welfare in the case of potential hidden depth
with the fully transparent case. We assume that he adheres to the optimal buy and sell
timing strategies derived above. We derive the welfare function for the iceberg case,
and adapt it according to the results in Sect. 3 for the fully transparent case.
The current (time 0) expected discounted total surplus with critical levels vB H
τ∗b
and
k B Hτ∗s and first passage times τ
∗
b and τ ∗s is given by
W
(
vB
H
τ∗b
, k B Hτ∗s
)
=
(
1 − pAτ∗b
)
V ∗s
(
k B Hτ∗s
)
, (15)
where V ∗s (k B
H
τ∗s ) (given by Eq. 4) is the current expected discounted value from selling
at τ ∗s . However, he will only get this payoff if his buy order is filled at A at τ ∗b ; i.e.,
with probability 1 − pA
τ∗b
.
The uncertainty over the first passage times through τ ∗b and τ ∗s is incorporated in a
similar vein to that in Thijssen et al. (2006). Define the ex ante expected total welfare
from the round trip trade at time τ0 = 0, W (vB Hτ∗b , k
B H
τ∗s ), to be the expectation of the
discounted total surplus over the first passage times through vB H
τ∗b
and k B Hτ∗s . Thus
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W
(
vB
H
τ∗b
, k B Hτ∗s
)
:= E0
vB H
τ∗b
,k B H
τ∗s
[
W
(
vB
H
τ∗b
, k B Hτ∗s
)]
= E0
vB H
τ∗b
[(
1 − pAτ∗b
)
E0
k B H
τ∗s
[
V ∗s
(
k B Hτ∗s
)]]
=
∫ Tb
0
(
1 − pAτ∗b
)
E0
k B H
τ∗s
[
V ∗s
(
k B Hτ∗s
)]
f
vB H
τ∗b
(τ ∗b )dτ ∗b
=
∫ Tb
0
(
1 − pAτ∗b
)(∫ Ts
0
V ∗s
(
k B Hτ∗s
)
fk B H
τ∗s
(τ ∗s )dτ ∗s
)
f
vB H
τ∗b
(τ ∗b )dτ ∗b ,
(16)
where
∫ Tb
0 fvB H
τ∗b
(τ ∗b )dτ ∗b = P(vτ ≥ vB
H
τ∗b
) and
∫ Ts
0 fk B H
τ∗s
(τ ∗s )dτ ∗s = P(kτ ≤ k B Hτ∗s );
i.e; the respective probabilities that the buy and sell thresholds are hit before some
times Tb and Ts .
Proposition 5 1. The probability density function of the first passage time through
k B Hτ∗s is given by:
fk B H
τ∗s
(τ ∗s ) =
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ∗s − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B H
τ∗s /2
×
|k B Hτ∗s |
τ ∗s
I|k B H
τ∗s |
(
2λ
√
q1
(
k B Hτ∗s − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
τ ∗s
)
e−λτ∗s ,
(17)
for all k B Hτ∗s , where
Ik B H
τ∗s
(x) =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(
n + k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
( x
2
)2n+k B H
τ∗s (18)
is the modified Bessel function with parameter k B Hτ∗s . (·) denotes the Gammafunction and
q1
(
k B Hτ∗s − 1
)
= θ
k B H
τ∗s + (1 − θ)k B
H
τ∗s
θ
k B H
τ∗s −1 + (1 − θ)k B
H
τ∗s −1
(19)
and
q2
(
k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
= θ(1 − θ)θ
k B H
τ∗s −2 + (1 − θ)k
B H
τ∗s −2
θ
k B H
τ∗s −1 + (1 − θ)k
B H
τ∗s −1
. (20)
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2. The probability density function of the first passage time through vB H
τ∗b
is given by:
f
vB H
τ∗b
(τ ∗b ) =
⎛
⎝ qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
⎞
⎠
vB
H
τ∗b
/2
×
|vB H
τ∗b
|
τ ∗b
I|vB H
τ∗b
|
(
2λ
√
qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
τ ∗b
)
e−λτ∗b ,
(21)
for all vB H
τ∗b
, where
qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
= η(1 − η)η
vB
H
τ∗b
−2 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−2
η
vB H
τ∗b
−1 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−1
(22)
and
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
= η
vB
H
τ∗b + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
η
vB H
τ∗b
−1 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−1
. (23)
Proof See Appendix D. unionsq
4.1 Welfare results
We plot the ex ante expected total welfare from the round trip trade as a function of
the arrival rate of orders to the LOB in the case where hidden depth may be present
and the fully transparent case in Fig. 2. Our rationale for choosing λ as the variable
parameter is that it is neutral in terms hidden depth presence or absence in a way that,
say, the quality of orders as signals of depth would not be. However, choosing any of
the parameters gives the same qualitative conclusion about the impact of iceberg orders
on traders’ welfare. The results we obtain are robust to a wide choice of parameter
values, but the parameters we choose here are as follows (Table 1):
We observe that welfare is always higher in the fully transparent case (i.e., no
hidden depth). Even though the probability of getting his sell order filled in the fully
transparent case is lower because depth is lower in the book (see Fig. 3) and he has
to wait until he is certain that it will be filled, there is no possibility of making a
loss in that case. In the hidden depth case, depth is greater which implies he submits
his sell order when he is not certain it will be executed at the high price. Thus, he
risks getting his order filled at BL and thereby making a loss, whereas in the fully
transparent case he does not face such a risk. Moreover, on the buy side, he does not
face any uncertainty over whether it will be filled in the fully transparent case, making
his overall expected payoff from the round trip trade higher than in the hidden depth
case.
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Fig. 2 Expected welfare as a function of λ in the iceberg case where hidden depth may be present and the
fully transparent case of no hidden depth
Table 1 Parameter values
θ = 0.65 η = 0.75 q0 = 0.4
r = 0.1 λ = 5 Q = 2
A = 4 γ = 4
Fig. 3 Probability that the trader’s sell order will be filled in the fully transparent (F–T) case and in the
iceberg case as a function of λ
Hence, we can conclude that even though depth is lower in LOBs which are fully
transparent, traders with no use for submitting iceberg orders are still better off sub-
mitting orders to fully transparent markets rather than to markets with greater depth
being present via the placement of iceberg orders.
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5 Conclusion
The use of iceberg orders, which are a special type of limit order which allows traders
to hide a portion of their order size in order to manage exposure risk, has become
prevalent in many electronic limit order markets. As a consequence, regulators are
particularly concerned about the effects of opacity in LOBs on the distribution of
welfare between small and large traders. There is ample evidence that large traders
who submit iceberg orders benefit in terms of being able to reduce the exposure risk,
but there appears to be no investigation into how small traders, who have no use for
submitting such orders, are affected. The regulators’ concern rests on the fact that
liquidity will migrate from transparent markets to markets which allow iceberg order
placement and thereby impact on the welfare of those traders, typically small traders,
who use transparent markets.
In this paper we develop a model which allows us to investigate whether small
traders are better off submitting orders to fully transparent markets or to markets
which allow the placement of iceberg orders. We find that, while the former markets
are less liquid than markets with iceberg orders, surprisingly, traders are much better
off submitting their orders to these markets rather than to the more liquid, but partially
opaque markets with iceberg orders.
There have been no empirical investigations, as far as we are aware, which support or
refute our result. Nevertheless, our model is a sound representation of the issues traders
face when submitting to iceberg markets over fully transparent markets, and hence,
we believe our result is robust. In particular, the overarching and most stylised feature
of our model is the way in which traders infer the presence of hidden depth in iceberg
markets by observing patterns in the limit order book and updating their inferences
accordingly. Indeed, according to empirical evidence by DeWinne and D’Hondt (2007)
and Frey and Sandås (2009), this is indeed what they do to determine whether their
orders are likely to get executed or not. Therefore, our model is adequately underpinned
by empirical evidence to give our result sufficient credence. Nonetheless, it would
certainly be worthwhile to investigate whether our result is supported by the data
which as a topic for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
For the investor wanting to sell the asset, his optimal timing strategy is derived as
follows.
123
The dampening effect of iceberg orders on small traders...
1. If vB Hτ < 0, then sell orders prevail at B H and if the investor were to submit a
market order to sell at B H at τ , he knows with certainty that his order would not
be executed at B H but would walk through the book and execute at an average
price of BL < Aer(τ−τb), resulting in a loss.
2. Assume that vB Hτ ≥ 0 and that the investor purchased Q units of the asset at time
τb ≤ τ (where τ is the current time). We must find a k B Hτ∗s at or below which he will
submit a market order to sell the asset. In order to determine this threshold level,
we must consider what the optimal strategy is if k B Hτ changes by one unit. If, for
example, at some time τ the level of k B Hτ is such that it is optimal for the trader
to wait; i.e., k B Hτ > k B
H
τ∗s . Now say an order is submitted and k
B H
τ decreases by 20
units such that k B Hτ −20 < k B Hτ∗s ; i.e., somewhere in the range [k B
H
τ −1, k B Hτ −20]
it changed from it being optimal to wait to being optimal to sell. But there are 20
possible values that the threshold could be in this case. Therefore, in order to solve
for the threshold, the approach must be to focus on a narrow range such that there
is only one possible value at which that change in optimal strategy could occur.
Thus Δk B Hτ = ±1 hereafter.
Scenario 1: Say the state of the process k B Hτ is such that even after the entry of
another iceberg release on the bid side (i.e., another signal indicating the presence
of hidden depth of buy orders), it will still not be optimal for the investor to submit
a sell market order; that is k B Hτ updates to k B
H
τ − 1 which, in turn, strengthens
his conviction that his order will be filled since there is further evidence of hidden
depth. However, we are supposing that k B Hτ − 1 > k B Hτ∗s implying he is still not
sufficiently convinced that it will get executed at B H to submit the sell order. In
this case, the associated Bellman equation is given by (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
= e−rdt Eτ
[
Vs1
(
k B Hτ+dt
)]

⇒ r Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
dt = (1 − rdt)Eτ
[
dVs1
(
k B Hτ+dt
)]
, (A.1)
where Vs1(k B
H
τ ) denotes the value of the option to sell in state k B
H
τ under Scenario
1. Equation (A.1) states that the value of the option to sell in state k B Hτ must equal
the expected discounted value an infinitesimal amount of time later.
Eτ
[
dVs1
(
k B Hτ+dt
)]
= λdt
[
Pk B Hτ +1
(
Vs1
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
− Vs1
(
k B Hτ
))
+ Pk B Hτ −1
(
Vs1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
− Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)) ]
, (A.2)
such that Pk B Hτ +1 denotes the probability of reaching k
B H
τ + 1 from k B Hτ , and
Pk B Hτ −1 denotes the probability of reaching k
B H
τ − 1 from k B Hτ . Equation (A.1)
then becomes
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r + λ
λ
Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
= Pk B Hτ +1Vs1
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
+ Pk B Hτ −1Vs1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
. (A.3)
Now Pk B Hτ +1 and Pk B Hτ −1 are determined as follows. Recall that k
B H
τ :=
v
B H f
τ −vB H iτ , where vB
H f
τ +vB H iτ = vB Hτ . Since vB Hτ ≥ 0, buy orders prevail
in the LOB at B H . Hence vB
H f
τ are visible buy orders that the investor deems
to be full orders, and vB H iτ are visible buy orders that are deemed to have hid-
den depth associated with them. To highlight that these are visible buy orders, we
denote vB
H f
τ by vbB
H f
τ and vB
H i
τ by vbB
H i
τ for the moment. Hence
k B Hτ ≡ vbB
H f
τ − vbB
H i
τ .
The ways in which k B Hτ can change by one unit are as follows:
– Say a new buy order enters the LOB with probability P(B), and it is deemed
by the investor to be a full order. With probability θ this is correct. Then
k B Hτ increases to (vb
B H f
τ + 1) − vbB H iτ = k B Hτ + 1 with probability P(B)θ .
However, if that order was actually part of an iceberg order (i.e., investor was
incorrect), then k B Hτ decreases to vbB
H f
τ − (vbB H iτ + 1) = k B Hτ − 1. The latter
occurs w.p. P(B)(1 − θ).
– Say a new buy order enters the LOB with probability P(B), and it is deemed
an iceberg order. With probability θ this is correct. Then k B Hτ decreases to
vbB
H f
τ − (vbB H iτ + 1) = k B Hτ − 1 with probability P(B)θ . However, if that
order was actually a full order (i.e., investor was incorrect), then k B Hτ increases
to (vbB
H f
τ + 1) − vbB H iτ = k B Hτ + 1. The latter occurs w.p. P(B)(1 − θ).
– Say a new sell order enters the LOB w.p. (1 − P(B)) and it executed against
one of the buys. That buy is deemed a full order and this is accurate. Therefore
k B Hτ decreases to (vb
B H f
τ − 1) − vbB H iτ = k B Hτ − 1 w.p. (1 − P(B))θ . If the
order it executes against is actually part of an iceberg order, then k B Hτ increases
to vbB
H f
τ − (vbB H iτ − 1) = k B Hτ + 1 w.p. (1 − P(B))(1 − θ).
– Say a new sell order enters the LOB w.p. (1 − P(B)) and it executed against
one of the buys. That buy is deemed an iceberg order and this is accurate.
Therefore k B Hτ increases to vb
B H f
τ −(vbB H iτ −1) = k B Hτ +1 w.p. (1− P(B))θ .
If the order it executes against is actually a full order, then k B Hτ decreases to
(vbB
H f
τ − 1) − vbB H iτ = k B Hτ − 1 w.p. (1 − P(B))(1 − θ).
However, in determining Pk B Hτ +1 and Pk B Hτ −1 fully, we must account for the
investor’s conditional probability that the LOB is accurately represented by what
is visible, i.e., pB Hτ (cf. Eq. 1).
– First, if the new visible order to enter the LOB is a buy limit order and is deemed
by the investor to be a full (iceberg) order, then the number of visible full buy
orders relative to the number of visible iceberg buys increases (decreases) by
one unit; i.e., k B Hτ increases to k B
H
τ + 1 (resp. k B Hτ decreases to k B Hτ − 1).
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Hence, the entry of that order makes the LOB a relatively more (less) accurate
representation of the true net demand at B H . From the investor’s perspective,
this occurs w.p. pB Hτ (resp. (1 − pB Hτ )).
– However, if the new visible order to enter the LOB is a sell limit order and
executes against what is deemed to be a full (iceberg) buy order, then k B Hτ
decreases to k B Hτ −1 (resp. k B Hτ increases to k B Hτ +1) and the true net demand
in LOB is then less (more) accurately represented by the visible part from the
investor’s perspective. This occurs w.p. (1 − pB Hτ ) (resp. w.p. pB Hτ ).
Putting all this together, k B Hτ increases to k B
H
τ + 1 w.p. Pk B Hτ +1, where
Pk B Hτ +1 = p
B H
τ (θ P(B) + θ(1 − P(B)))
+
(
1 − pB Hτ
)
((1 − θ)P(B) + (1 − θ)(1 − P(B)))
= pB Hτ θ +
(
1 − pB Hτ
)
(1 − θ). (A.4)
Similarly
Pk B Hτ −1 =
(
1 − pB Hτ
)
θ + pB Hτ (1 − θ). (A.5)
Replacing for pB Hτ using Eq. (1) and Pk B Hτ +1 and Pk B Hτ −1 in Eq. (A.3) yields the
second order homogeneous difference equation
V˜s1
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
− r + λ
λ
V˜s1
(
k B Hτ
)
+ θ(1 − θ)V˜s1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
= 0, (A.6)
where V˜s1
(
k B Hτ
)
:=
(
θk
B H
τ + (1 − θ)k B Hτ
)
Vs1(k B
H
τ ).
Equation (A.6) admits the following general solution
Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
= A1β
k B Hτ
1 + A2βk
B H
τ
2
θk
B H
τ + (1 − θ)k B Hτ
, (A.7)
where A1 and A2 are constant and β1,2 are the real roots of the following quadratic
equation
Q(β) = β2 −
(
r + λ
λ
)
β + θ(1 − θ) = 0. (A.8)
Now, the higher is k B Hτ , the less likely it is that there is sufficient hidden depth in the
book to fill the investor’s order fully at B H and, hence, the lower is the value of the
selling opportunity to the investor. Hence, we impose the condition that
∂Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
∂k B Hτ
< 0. (A.9)
123
L. Delaney, P. Kovaleva
Letting β1 > 0 denote the larger of the two roots, to ensure this condition is always
satisfied, we must let A1 = 0. This is because it holds that 0 < β2 < 1 − θ < θ < β1
(cf. Thijssen et al. 2004) and, so, the numerator in (A.7) dominates and Vs1(k B Hτ )
increases in k B Hτ for all A1 = 0. Hence
Vs1
(
k B Hτ
)
= A2β
k B Hτ
2
θk
B H
τ + (1 − θ)k B Hτ
. (A.10)
Scenario 2: Alternatively, if k B Hτ is such that after one more net iceberg release on the
bid side, then it will be optimal for the investor to submit his sell market order; that is
k B Hτ > k B
H
τ∗s , but k
B H
τ − 1 ≤ k B Hτ∗s or, in other words, k B
H
τ∗s < k
B H
τ ≤ k B Hτ∗s + 1. Letting
Vs2(·) denote the value of the option to sell in Scenario 2, the Bellman equation is
then given by
r + λ
λ
Vs2
(
k B Hτ
)
=
(
θpB
H
τ + (1 − θ)
(
1 − pB Hτ
))
Vs1
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
+
(
(1 − θ)pB Hτ + θ
(
1 − pB Hτ
))
Vs0(k B
H
τ − 1), (A.11)
where Vs0(k B
H
τ ) is the current expected value obtained from submitting a market sell
order in state k B Hτ ; that is,
Vs0
(
k B Hτ
)
= Q
(
pB
H
τ
(
BL − Aer(τ−τb)
)
+
(
1 − pB Hτ
) (
B H − Aer(τ−τb)
))
=
(
1 − 2pB Hτ
)
Qγ. (A.12)
By replacing for Vs1(k B
H
τ + 1) and Vs0(k B Hτ − 1) in Eq. (A.11), k B Hτ∗s can then bedetermined by solving for the following value matching conditions:
Vs1
(
k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
= Vs2
(
k B Hτ∗s + 1
)
(A.13)
and
Vs2
(
k B Hτ∗s
)
= Vs0
(
k B Hτ∗s
)
. (A.14)
From (A.13), we get that
A2β
k B H
τ∗s +1
2 =
λθ(1 − θ)
λ(β2 − 1) − r
(
θ
k B H
τ∗s − (1 − θ)k
B H
τ∗s
)
Qγ (A.15)
and replacing for this in Eq. (A.14) yields
pB
H
τ∗s =
(r + λ(1 − θ)) (r + λ(1 − β2)) − λ2θ(1 − θ)
(2r + λ) (r + λ(1 − β2)) − 2λ2θ(1 − θ) . (A.16)
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This gives
k B Hτ∗s =
ln
(
1−pB H
τ∗s
pB H
τ∗s
)
ln
( 1−θ
θ
) . (A.17)
For completeness, we show that pB Hτ∗s is a well-defined probability.
We can re-write Eq. (A.16) as follows:
pB
H
τ∗s =
β1 (r + λ(1 − θ)) − λθ(1 − θ)
β1(2r + λ) − 2λθ(1 − θ) , (A.18)
since λβ1 ≡ r + λ(1 − β2).
If r = 0, the numerator of pB Hτ∗s , denoted by n(pB
H
τ∗s ), is zero and ∂n(p
B H
τ∗s )/∂r > 0
since ∂β1/∂r > 0. Thus, n(pB
H
τ∗s ) > 0. Similarly, the denominator of p
B H
τ∗s is positive
since θ > 1/2 by assumption. Thus, pB Hτ∗s > 0.
Furthermore pB Hτ∗s ≤ 1 iff λθ(1 − θ) − β1(r + λθ) ≤ 0. If r = 0, this is true and
∂ (λθ(1 − θ) − β1(r + λθ)) /∂r < 0. Thus, the condition holds.
Hence, pB Hτ∗s is a well-defined probability.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
For the investor wanting to buy the asset, his optimal timing strategy is derived as
follows.
1. If vAτ > 0, the total number of bids for the stock exceed the total number of offers
at price A. There is no hidden depth on the offer side at that price or else it would
be matched with the available bids. Hence, the investor will never submit a market
order to buy the stock at A because, with certainty, it will not be executed fully.
2. If vAτ < 0 and vB
H
τ < 0, then the investor will monitor the flow of orders for the
stock at B H and invest at A when he is convinced that the demand for the asset
will increase sufficiently in the future so that he will execute his full sell order at
B H .
Scenario 1: If vB Hτ is such that even if one aggressive buy order enters the LOB
at B H , it will still not be optimal for the investor to submit a buy order; i.e.,
vB
H
τ + 1 <vB Hτ∗b , then the value of his option to buy in this scenario, denoted as
Vb1(vB
H
τ ), is given by the solution to the following Bellman equation (cf. Appendix
B)
r + λ
λ
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ
)
= QvB Hτ +1Vb1
(
vB
H
τ + 1
)
+ QvB Hτ −1Vb1
(
vB
H
τ − 1
)
, (B.1)
where QvB Hτ +1 and QvB Hτ −1 denote the respective probabilities of reaching v
B H
τ +
1 and vB Hτ − 1 from vB Hτ .
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For vB Hτ < 0, vB
H
τ increases to vB
H
τ + 1 iff an only if a buy order enters the book.
Thus P(B) = 1. Additionally, one of the following must occur:
– An aggressive buy order enters the LOB at B H and executes against one of the
sells. The order is deemed to be a true representation of future demand and this is
accurate. This event occurs with probability q B Hτ η.
– An aggressive buy order enters the LOB at B H and executes against one of the
sells. The order is deemed to be a false order (eg. fleeting) and this is inaccurate.
This event occurs with probability (1 − q B Hτ )(1 − η).
Thus
Qk B Hτ +1 = q
B H
τ η +
(
1 − q B Hτ
)
(1 − η). (B.2)
vB
H
τ decreases to vB
H
τ − 1 iff an only if a sell order enters the book. Then by a similar
reasoning to above
Qk B Hτ −1 =
(
1 − q B Hτ
)
η + q B Hτ (1 − η). (B.3)
Substituting for q B Hτ , Qk B Hτ +1 and Qk B Hτ −1 (B.1) gives
r + λ
λ
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ
)
= η
vB
H
τ +1 + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ +1
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ + 1
)
+η(1 − η)η
vB
H
τ −1 + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ −1
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ − 1
)
. (B.4)
Equation (B.4) has general solution
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ
)
= B1α
vB
H
τ
1 + B2αv
B H
τ
2
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
, (B.5)
where B1 and B2 are constant and α1 and α2 are the two real roots of the following
equation:
α2 − r + λ
λ
α + η(1 − η) = 0. (B.6)
One condition that the Vb1(vB
H
τ ) must satisfy is that limvB Hτ →−∞ Vb1(v
B H
τ ) = 0.
Letting α1 > 0 denote the larger root, it holds that 0 < α2 < 1 − η < η < α1. This
implies that the condition will hold iff B2 = 0. Hence
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ
)
= B1α
vB
H
τ
1
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
. (B.7)
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Scenario 2: Another state of vB Hτ could be such that if one aggressive buy order at
B H depletes the sell side by one, then it will be optimal for the investor to buy; i.e.,
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1 ≤vB Hτ <vB Hτ∗b . The value of the option to buy in this region, denoted by
Vb2(vB
H
τ ) is given by the solution to the following bellman equation
r + λ
λ
Vb2
(
vB
H
τ
)
= η
vB
H
τ +1 + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ +1
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
Vb0
(
vB
H
τ + 1
)
+η(1 − η)η
vB
H
τ −1 + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ −1
ηv
B H
τ + ζ(1 − η)vB Hτ
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ − 1
)
, (B.8)
where Vb1(vB
H
τ ) is given by (B.5) and Vb0(vB
H
τ ) is the value to the manager from
investing in state vB Hτ ; i.e.,
Vb0
(
vB
H
τ
)
= (1 − p(k Aτ ))Vs1(k B
H
τ ) ≡ Vb(k Aτ , vB
H
τ )
(cf. Eq. 12).
The threshold, vB H
τ∗b
then satisfies the following two value matching conditions
Vb1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
= Vb2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
(B.9)
and
Vb2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
)
= Vb0
(
vB
H
τ∗b
)
. (B.10)
From (B.9) and (B.10) we get
q B
H
τ∗b
= 1
2η − 1
(
r + λ
λ
− α1λη(1 − η)
α1(r + λ) − λη(1 − η)
) Vb0
(
vB
H
τ∗b
)
Vb0
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
) − 1 − η
2η − 1 .
(B.11)
Now we must consider Vb0(vB
H
τ∗b
) a bit more closely because are vB H
τ∗b
and k B H
τ∗b
are
inter-related variables. If at time τ ∗b , the state of the processes are vB
H
τ∗b
and k B H
τ∗b
, then
Vb0(vB
H
τ∗b
) = (1 − p(k A
τ∗b
))Vs1(k B
H
τ∗b
). However, if an aggressive buy limit order enters
the book at B H and depletes the sell side, vB H
τ∗b
increases to vB H
τ∗b
+1, but k B H
τ∗b
becomes
k B H
τ∗b
± 1. The reasoning is as follows.
Recall that vB Hτ := bB Hτ − s B Hτ where bB Hτ and s B Hτ denote the number of visible
buy and sell orders (those with and without hidden depth) recorded in the LOB at B H
at τ , respectively. The current situation is that vB H
τ∗b
< 0 and, thus, vB H
τ∗b
= −s B H
τ∗b
≡
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−(s B H f
τ∗b
+ s B H i
τ∗b
). Moreover, k B H
τ∗b
= |s B H f
τ∗b
| − |s B H i
τ∗b
|. If one aggressive buy order
enters the book at B H , it will execute against the sell order at the front of the queue
in the LOB. Irrespective of whether this sell is a full or iceberg order, vB H
τ∗b
increases
to −(s B H f
τ∗b
+ s B H i
τ∗b
− 1) = vB H + 1. However, if the order at the front of the queue is
a full sell order, then k B H
τ∗b
decreases to |s B H f
τ∗b
− 1| − |s B H i
τ∗b
| = k B H
τ∗b
− 1, but if it is an
iceberg order, k B H
τ∗b
increases to |s B H f
τ∗b
| − |s B H i
τ∗b
− 1| = k B H
τ∗b
+ 1.
Finally, if vB H
τ∗b
increases to vB H
τ∗b
+ 1, then k B H
τ∗b
increases to k B H
τ∗b
+ 1 with probability
(1 − θ)pB H
τ∗b
+ θ(1 − pB H
τ∗b
).8 However, since vB H
τ∗b
< 0, his sell order will not get filled
with certainty and pB H
τ∗b
= 1. Thus, k B H
τ∗b
increases to k B H
τ∗b
+1 with probability (1− θ).
Similarly, k B H
τ∗b
decreases to k B H
τ∗b
− 1 if vB H
τ∗b
increases to vB H
τ∗b
+ 1 with probability θ .
Therefore,
Vb0
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
=
(
1 − p
(
k Aτ∗b
)) [
(1 − θ)Vs1
(
k B Hτ∗b + 1
)
+ θVs1
(
k B Hτ∗b − 1
)]
(B.12)
where Vs1(k B
H
τ ) is given by Eq. (A.10).
Replacing for Vb0(vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1) and Vb0(vB Hτ∗b ) in Eq. (B.11) gives
q B
H
τ∗b
= η − 1
2η − 1 +
β2
2η − 1
(
r + λ
λ
− α1λη(1 − η)
α1(r + λ) − λη(1 − η)
)
×
1
θ + 11−θ
(
1−θ
θ
)k B H
τ∗b
1 +
(
1−θ
θ
)k B H
τ∗b
1 +
(
1−θ
θ
)k B H
τ∗b
+1
(1 − θ)β22
(
1
θ2
+ 1
θ(1−θ)
(
1−θ
θ
)k B H
τ∗b
)
+ θ
(
1 +
(
1−θ
θ
)k B H
τ∗b
+1
)
(B.13)
8 vB
H
τ∗b
increases to vB H
τ∗b
+ 1 iff a buy order entered the LOB. Hence P(B) = 1. If the buy executes against
what is accurately deemed to be an iceberg sell order, this will reduce the visible representation of hidden
depth in the LOB. However, vB H
τ∗b
< 0 but he will only sell at some τs such that vB
H
τs
> 0. Therefore, in
this case, he favors less hidden depth since this implies that the threshold vB H
τ∗s will be reached quicker,
strengthening his conviction that his sell order will get filled. This event occurs with probability θ(1− pB H
τ∗b
).
On the other hand, k B H
τ∗b
increases to k B H
τ∗b
+ 1 if the buy executes against what is inaccurately deemed to
be a full order. This occurs with probability (1 − θ)pB H
τ∗b
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But since pB H
τ∗b
= 1, we must take the limit as k B H
τ∗b
tends to infinity. Hence
q B
H
τ∗b
= η − 1
2η − 1 +
β2
2η − 1
(
r + λ
λ
− α1λη(1 − η)
α1(r + λ) − λη(1 − η)
)(
θ
(1 − θ)β22 + θ3
)
(B.14)
Hence
vB
H
τ∗b
=
ln
(
1−q B H
τ∗b
q B H
τ∗b
)
− ln ζ
ln
(
1−η
η
) , (B.15)
which is well defined for 0 < q B H
τ∗b
< 1. If q B H
τ∗b
≥ 1, then vB H
τ∗b
= +∞, and if
q B H
τ∗b
≤ 0, vB H
τ∗b
= −∞.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
1. Let Pk B Hτ (τ ) denote the conditional probability that the imbalance between new
and iceberg orders at B H is k B Hτ at time τ (for all k B
H
τ ∈ Z ). When the investor
started monitoring the order flow at B H , k B Hτ0 = 0. Therefore, k B
H
τ could only have
been reached if a jump occurred before τ . Hence, Pk B Hτ (τ ) is the convolution of
the probability that the imbalance was at k B Hτ +1 at some time t < τ or at k B Hτ −1
at time t , where t is the time at which the last jump occurred. Recall that the arrival
of order to the limit order book follows a Poisson process with parameter λ, then
Pk B Hτ (τ ) =
∫ τ
τ0
λe−λ(τ−t)
(
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
Pk B Hτ −1(t)
+ q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
Pk B Hτ +1(t)
)
dt, (C.1)
such that q1(k B
H
τ − 1) is the probability of reaching k B Hτ from k B Hτ − 1 and
q2(k B
H
τ + 1) is the probability of reaching k B Hτ from k B Hτ + 1.
Taking the Laplace transform of Pk B Hτ (τ ), (C.1) gives the following homogeneous
difference equation (cf. Feller 1971)
λq2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
Lk B Hτ +1(s) − (λ + s)Lk B Hτ (s) + λq1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
Lk B Hτ −1(s) = 0(C.2)
where Lk B Hτ (s) denotes the Laplace transform of Pk B Hτ (τ ).
Equation (C.2) has a general solution of the form
Lk B Hτ (s) = L1κ
k B Hτ
1 + L2κk
B H
τ
2 , (C.3)
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where
κ1 =
λ + s −
√
(λ + s)2 − 4λ2q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
2λq2
(
k B Hτ + 1
) (C.4)
and
κ2 =
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
) κ−11 (C.5)
are the roots of the characteristic equation of (C.2).
Assume k B Hτ > 0. Then as s → ∞, κ1 → 0. It must be true that Lk B Hτ (s) is
bounded as s → ∞. To ensure this is satisfied, we must set L2 = 0. Then
Lk B Hτ (s) = L1κ
k B Hτ
1 ≡ L0(s)κk
B H
τ
1 . (C.6)
However, for k B Hτ ≤ 0, we must have that L1 = 0 so that Lk B Hτ (s) is bounded as
s → ∞. Thus, for k B Hτ ≤ 0
Lk B Hτ (s) =
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ
L0(s)κ−k
B H
τ
1 . (C.7)
Now, if at time τ , the state is k B Hτ , the first passage time through k B
H
τ must have
occurred at some time, say τ ′ ≤ τ . The conditional probability of reaching state
k B Hτ again at time τ is given by (cf. Thijssen et al. 2006)
Pk B Hτ (τ ) =
∫ τ
τ0
fk B Hτ (τ
′)P0(τ − τ ′)dτ ′, (C.8)
where P0(τ − τ ′) denotes the probability of being at state 0 at time τ − τ ′ and
fk B Hτ (τ
′) is the probability of a first passage time through k B Hτ at time τ ′. Equa-
tion (C.8) is actually the convolution of the fk B Hτ (τ
′) and P0(τ − τ ′), and the
Laplace transform of a convolution of two functions is simply the product of
the Laplace transforms of the individual functions (Feller 1971). Therefore, the
Laplace transform of (C.8) is given by
L
(
Pk B Hτ (τ )
)
= L
(
fk B Hτ (τ
′)
)
L0(s). (C.9)
But L(Pk B Hτ (τ )) ≡ Lk B Hτ (s). Thus, when k
B H
τ > 0, from Eq. (C.6),
L
(
fk B Hτ (τ
′)
)
= κk B
H
τ
1 (C.10)
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and from Eq. (C.7), when k B Hτ ≤ 0,
L
(
fk B Hτ (τ
′)
)
=
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ
κ
−k B Hτ
1 . (C.11)
Now for k B Hτ > 0
fk B Hτ (τ
′) = L−1
(
κ
k B Hτ
1
)
=
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ /2
L−1
((
sˆ −
√
sˆ2 − 1
)k B Hτ
)
(C.12)
for sˆ = (λ + s) /
(
2λ
√
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
))
and
fk B Hτ (τ
′) =
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ /2
L−1
((
sˆ −
√
sˆ2 − 1
)−k B Hτ
)
, (C.13)
for k B Hτ ≤ 0.
From Feller (1971) (page 437),
L−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎝ s
y
−
√(
s
y
)2
− 1
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
k B Hτ
τ ′
Ik B Hτ
(
yτ ′
)
, (C.14)
and
L−1
((
s + x −
√
(s + x)2 − 1
)k B Hτ
)
= e−τ ′x k
B H
τ
τ ′
Ik B Hτ (τ
′), (C.15)
where Ik(x) is the modified Bessel function with parameter k. Applying these
results gives
L−1
((
sˆ −
√
sˆ2 − 1
)k B Hτ
)
=e−λτ ′ k
B H
τ
τ ′
Ik B Hτ (2λ
√
q1
(
k B Hτ −1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
τ ′).
(C.16)
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Substituting into Eqs. (C.12) and (C.13) gives
fk B Hτ (τ
′) = e−λτ ′
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ /2
×k
B H
τ
τ ′
Ik B Hτ (2λ
√
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
τ ′) (C.17)
for k B Hτ > 0, and
fk B Hτ (τ
′) = −e−λτ ′
⎛
⎝q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
⎞
⎠
k B Hτ /2
× k
B H
τ
τ ′
I−k B Hτ (2λ
√
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
τ ′) (C.18)
for k B Hτ ≤ 0.
Returning to q1(k B
H
τ − 1) and q2(k B Hτ + 1). These probabilities take different
forms depending on whether vB Hτ > 0 or vB
H
τ ≤ 0. Since at τ ∗s , vB Hτ∗s > 0, we need
only consider the case for vB Hτ > 0.
If vB Hτ > 0, buy orders prevail at B H and the probability of reaching k B
H
τ from
k B Hτ − 1 is given by
q1
(
k B Hτ − 1
)
= p(k B Hτ − 1)θ +
(
1 − p
(
k B Hτ − 1
))
(1 − θ)
= θ
k B Hτ + (1 − θ)k B Hτ
θk
B H
τ −1 + (1 − θ)k B Hτ −1
(C.19)
(from Appendix B), and the probability of reaching k B Hτ from k B
H
τ + 1 is
q2
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
= θ
(
1 − p
(
k B Hτ + 1
))
+ (1 − θ)p
(
k B Hτ + 1
)
= θ(1 − θ)θ
k B Hτ −2 + (1 − θ)k B Hτ −2
θk
B H
τ −1 + (1 − θ)k B Hτ −1
. (C.20)
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2. The proof that
f
vB H
τ∗b
(τ ∗b ) =
⎛
⎝ qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
⎞
⎠
vB
H
τ∗b
/2
×
|vB H
τ∗b
|
τ ∗b
I|vB H
τ∗b
|
(
2λ
√
qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
))
e−λτ∗b ,
(C.21)
where qˆ1(vB
H
τ∗b
−1) and qˆ2(vB Hτ∗b +1) denote the respective probabilities of reaching
vB
H
τ∗b
from vB H
τ∗b
− 1 and vB H
τ∗b
+ 1, follows similarly.
However, at τ ∗b , vB
H
τ∗b
< 0. Thus,
qˆ1
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
= η
(
1 − q
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
))
+ (1 − η)q
(
vB
H
τ∗b
− 1
)
= η(1 − η)η
vB
H
τ∗b
−2 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−2
η
vB H
τ∗b
−1 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−1
(C.22)
and
qˆ2
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
= ηq
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
)
+ (1 − η)
(
1 − q
(
vB
H
τ∗b
+ 1
))
= η
vB
H
τ∗b + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
η
vB H
τ∗b
−1 + ζ(1 − η)v
B H
τ∗b
−1
(C.23)
(cf. Appendix C).
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